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is consistent with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland and reflects the
Supreme Court's reluctance to strike down state statutes involving eco-
nomic regulation.
4 3
JAMEs S. McNmR III
VI. CONFLICT OF LAWS
State workmen's compensation statutes cover most employers and
employees and facilitate quick and efficient damage recoveries for workers
injured on the job.' Individual state compensation acts, however, often
vary as to available benefits and procedures,2 thus creating conflicts of law
questions when an injured worker's employment spans two or more states.
3
Most courts confronted with a conflict between compensations act grant
ute would presumably be recouped by other manufacturers. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 153
Cal. Rptr. at 141. Prior to the Exxon decision, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled a Georgia
automobile franchise statute unconstitutional under the commerce clause. General GMC
Trucks v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 376, 237 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1977). The Georgia
statute prohibited additional dealerships unless the manufacturer or the potential fran-
chisee could demonstrate that an existing franchise dealer was not providing adequate rep-
resentation or that the addition of another dealer could be accomplished without reducing
the business of the existing dealer. Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 84-6610(f) (10) (1979) (superseded
1979).
'3 See 592 F.2d at 223-24; notes 30, 37 & 38 supra.
I Workmen's compensation refers to the system of providing cash-wage benefits to vic-
tims of work related injuries. Basic features of most workmen's compensation acts include
automatic recovery of benefits with minimal procedural requirements, little inquiry into
negligence or fault, restriction of coverage to employees, restriction of common law actions
by employees against employers, a right to sue responsible third parties, administration by
state government agencies, and provisions for insurance of employers against losses under the
acts. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 1.00, 1.10 (rev. perm. ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]. See generally THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 29-39 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
2 A special federal commission has concluded that because of the varying nature of state
workmen's compensation acts, all acts should have certain minimum benefits and basic
claims procedures. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS,
REPORT 15-27 (1972).
See, e.g., Daniels v. Trailer Transport Co., 327 Mich. 525, 42 N.W.2d 828 (1950).
Daniels is indicative of the potential conflicts problem in actions for workmen's compensation
recovery. The claimant, a resident of Illinois, made an employment contract in Texas with a
trucking firm headquartered in Michigan. The claimant, after working for the firm in a
number of states, was injured in Tennessee. A Michigan court held that the claimant was
ineligible for recovery under Michigan workmen's compensation statutes. Id. at _, 42
N.W.2d at 828-30. See generally Larson, Conflicts of Laws in Workmen's Compensation, in
1 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES FOR THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 129 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Larson, Conflicts].
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relief under as many statutes as the injured worker may be eligible.4 The
Fourth Circuit in Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc.,5 however, prevented a
worker's recovery of benefits under the District of Columbia Workmen's
Compensation Act (D.C. Act)' because the Virginia Industrial Commission
had terminated the worker's benefits7 under the Virginia Workmen's Com-
pensation Act (Virginia Act).' The Pettus court ruled that the Industrial
Commission's action barred subsequent recovery under the D.C. Act.,
In Pettus, the defendant employed the plaintiff at Washington Na-
tional Airport near Alexandria, Virginia. Three years after being hired, the
plaintiff, a District of Columbia resident,"0 injured his back while working
at the Virginia facility." The Virginia Industrial Commission ruled that
the plaintiff was temporarily totally disabled as a result of the injury and
awarded benefits under the Virginia Act. 2 A year later American Airlines
and its workmen's compensation insurance carrier terminated the benefits
See, e.g., deCancino v. Eastern Air Lines, 239 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. 1970) (Florida Work-
men's Compensation Act construed to give full coverage to all injuries in which Florida has
an interest, despite interest in the injury by other states); Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
260 Md. 651, 664, 273 A.2d 125, 133 (1971) (recovery awarded under both Maryland and
District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Acts). See also 4 LARSON, supra note 1, §
85.30; note 73 infra.
When a worker seeks workmen's compensation recovery in two or more states, any recov-
ery in the first state is credited against recovery in the second or later states, thus preventing
double recovery for a particular injury. See-Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,
460 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting); 4 LARSON, supra note 1, § 85.60.
587 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 172 (1979).
36 D.C. CODE §§ 501-02 (1973). The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, 33 U.S.C. § § 901-950 (1976), serves as the District of Columbia's workmen's compen-
sation statute. 36 D.C. CODE § 501.
7 See text accompanying notes 13-15 infra.
a VA. CODE §§ 65.1-1 to 152 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
587 F.2d at 628.
" The location of a workmen's compensation claimant's residence is one factor in deter-
mining where the claimant may seek compensation. Other factors include location of injury,
principal location of employment, location of employment contract execution, location from
which employee's activities were supervised, and choice of a particular compensation act
under which the.employer and employee have agreed to be governed. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 181 (1971). See generally 4 LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 86-87.
In Pettus, the claimant was not only a resident of the District of Columbia at the time of his
hiring and of his injury, but also had been interviewed and employed through a District of
Columbia employment agency. 587 F.2d at 628. See text accompanying notes 25-28 infra.
" 587 F.2d at 628. The injury to the Pettus claimant is clearly within the realm of the
Virginia Act because the injury occurred in Virginia at the claimant's regular work location.
Further, the injury clearly occurred in the performance of work related duties. See VA. CODE
§ 65.1-7 (1973). See also Graybeal v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Va. 77, 78-80, 216 S.E.2d 52,
53-54 (1975) (Virginia Act eligibility requirements discussed); JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONTINU-
ING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE VA. STATE BAR AND THE VA. BAR ASS'N, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
FOR THE EMPLOYER'S ATtoRNEY AND CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY 9-41 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
VA. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION]; note 10 supra.
,1 587 F.2d at 628. See Brief for Respondent Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs at 7, Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 587 F:2d 627 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Director, O.W.C.P.].
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after the plaintiff refused to undergo corrective surgery. 3 Following hear-
ings, the Virginia Industrial Commission upheld the termination of bene-
fits." The plaintiff did not appeal the Commission's decision to Virginia
courts, 5 but subsequently applied for benefits under the D.C. Act.8 The
Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor 7 awarded D.C. Act
benefits to the plaintiff, after reversing an administrative law judge's
finding that the plaintiff was ineligible for recovery under the D.C. Act. 9
American appealed the award of D.C. Act benefits to the Fourth Circuit. 0
The Fourth Circuit addressed three issues in overturning the Benefits
Review Board. The court first considered the question of whether the plain-
tiff's contacts with the District of Columbia were sufficient for recovery
'1 Brief for Director, O.W.C.P., supra note 12, at 9. The Virginia Act allows employers
to discontinue benefits in certain circumstances when claimants refuse to undergo recom-
mended treatment. VA. CODE § 65.1-88 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See text accompanying notes 32-
35 infra.
The attending orthopedic surgeon recommended that the Pettus plaintiff undergo sur-
gery after a period of conservative treatment failed to alleviate the plaintiff's disability. The
plaintiff refused to undergo the surgery for several reasons. First, the plaintiff contended the
surgeon told him that the surgery, a spinal fusion, involved considerable risk. The plaintiff
also alleged that his pre-existing asthmatic condition posed special dangers to undergoing
anesthesia during surgery. The plaintiff further noted that he was the sole support for his two
children and that if he were to die during surgery the children would be orphaned. Finally,
the plaintiff contended he had a morbid fear of hospitals based on his wife's death from
pneumonia while recuperating in a hospital after an accident. Brief for Respondent Pettus
at 5, Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief
for Pettus].
" 587 F.2d at 628.
,5 Id. See text accompanying notes 38-41 infra.
" 587 F.2d at 628. Applications for workmen's compensation in the District of Columbia
are filed through the same system provided for recoveries arising under the federal Longshore-
men's Act. See note 6 supra. The procedures for filing claims are set forth in 33 U.S.C.
§§ 913, 919 (1976). If an interested party in a workmen's compensation action requests a
hearing on the claim, the hearing is held before a Department of Labor administrative law
judge. Id. § 919(d).
11 The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board, a three member commission estab-
lished in 1972, hears appeals of administrative law judge decisions. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b). See
note 16 supra. See generally Washington, Benefits Review Board's New Appellate Process
Under the Longshoremen's Act, 11 FORUM 686 (1976). The D.C. Circuit has confirmed that
the Benefits Review Board's jurisdiction includes appeals arising under the D.C. Act. See In
re District of Columbia Workmen's Compensation Act, 554 F.2d 1075, 1077 n.1 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976).
" Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 6 BEN REv. BD. SERV. 461, 466 (B.R.B. No. 77-115,
Aug. 22, 1977).
" Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 3 BEN. RE V. BD. SERV. 315, 320 (B.R.B. No. 75-197,
March 19, 1976), rev'g 2 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. 93 (AUJ) (1975). An administrative law judge
found Pettus' business and personal connections with the District of Columbia too remote to
qualify Pettus for benefits under the D.C. Act. 2 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. at 93 (AUJ), but the
Benefits Review Board found sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia both on the
part of Pettus and on the part of American Airlines.,3 BEN. Rav. BD. SERV. at 317. See text
accompanying notes 25-28 infra.
20 587 F.2d at 628. A final Benefits Review Board decision is appealable to the United
States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1976).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
0
under the D.C. Act.' Second, the court explored whether the principles of
full faith and credit and res judicata bound the Benefits Review Board to
find that the plaintiff unjustifiably refused to have surgery. 2 Finally, the
Fourth Circuit considered whether any recovery under the Virginia Act
barred subsequent recovery under the D.C. Act regardless of the justifiabil-
ity of the refusal to undergo surgery.? The court decided only the eligibility
issue in the plaintiff's favor, effectively denying compensation under the
D.C. Act.
24
In finding that the plaintiff was within the jurisdiction of the D.C. Act,
the Fourth Circuit solely relied upon Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. 2 In Cardillo, the Supreme Court liberally interpreted the D.C. Act to
give workmen's compensation benefits to most District of Columbia resi-
dents working in other jurisdictions.2" The Court concluded the District of
Columbia had a significant interest in ensuring that employers adequately
compensated D.C. residents injured on the job. 27 The Pettus court gave no
support other than the cite of Cardillo for finding the plaintiff within the
D.C. Act's jurisdiction.2
The Fourth Circuit next considered whether under the doctrine of res
judicatal9 the withdrawal of benefits by the Virginia Industrial Commis-
21 See text accompanying notes 25-28 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 29-52 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 53-88 infra.
21 587 F.2d at 628. See note 28 infra.
2 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
21 Id. at 475. See Ekar v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 1 BEN. REv. BD. SERV.
406, 413 (B.R.B. No. 74-209, April 11, 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Boughman, 545 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(claimant's widow eligible for recovery under D.C. Act because claimant's employer was
headquartered in Washington, although claimant resided and was killed in California).
" 330 U.S. at 476. The District of Columbia had a significant interest in ensuring that
American Airlines adequately compensated the Pettus plaintiff. Even though the plaintiff
was injured in Virginia, he underwent rehabilitative vocational training at the expense of the
District of Columbia. Also, in the period after Virginia terminated the plaintiffs workmen's
compensation benefits, the plaintiff relied solely on District of Columbia public assistance
payments for financial support. See Brief for Director, O.W.C.P., supra note 12, at 9. See
generally 4 LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 86.34, 87.60.
21 587 F.2d at 628. The Fourth Circuit in Pettus did not actually state that the claimant's
contacts with the District of Columbia were sufficient to merit coverage under the D.C. Act.
Rather, the court phrased the issue of eligibility under the D.C. Act in terms of whether the
Benefits Review Board had jurisdiction to hear the claimant's case. Id. However, if the
claimant did not have sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia to merit recovery
under the D.C. Act, the Benefits Review Board could not decide the merits of the claimant's
action. See notes 16-17 supra. Further, if the Benefits Review Board lacked jurisdiction in
the case, the Fourth Circuit also would have lacked jurisdiction and thus would have been
unable to dispose of the case by interpreting Virginia law. See notes 21-24 supra.
" The doctrine of res judicata provides that a valid final judgment rendered on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between
the same parties, or those in privity with them, upon the same claim or demand. 1B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACmE 0.405[1], at 621-22 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1B MooRE's].
Some courts also hold that under the doctrine of res judicata a valid final judgment rendered
1980]
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sion bound the Benefits Review Board to find that the plaintiff unjustifia-
bly refused surgery 0 In establishing that the Virginia decision also pre-
cluded D.C. Act benefits the court first recognized that the same parties
were involved in both the Virginia and D.C. actions.3 ' The court next
determined that the Benefits Review Board had considered the same issue
as the Virginia Industrial Commission, whether Pettus' refusal to undergo
surgery was justified.32 The court compared the sections of the Virginia33
and D.C. 4 Acts dealing with refusal of a workmen's compensation recipi-
ent to undergo treatment and concluded that the justifiability standards
under both acts were, in fact, the same. 5 The Fourth Circuit then consid-
ered whether the Virginia proceedings met due process standards sufficient
to accord the decision res judicata effect." The court concluded the two
on the merits constitutes an estoppel in a second action as to matters that were necessarily
litigated in the first action although the second action involves a different claim or demand.
See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 108 F.2d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 1940) (res judicata effect
of state decision limited). Many courts, however, refer to the estoppel aspect of res judicata
as collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326
(1955) (res judicata and collateral estoppel distinguished); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94
U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876) (principles of collateral estoppel considered). See generally 1B
MooRE's, supra 0.441.
587 F.2d at 628-29.
1, Id. at 628. Under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral-estoppel the parties in
both actions must be identical or in privity with one another. See generally 1B MooRE's, supra
note 29, 0.411.
32 587 F.2d at 628-29. See generally Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48
(1897) (similarity of issue in two proceedings considered); 1B MooRE's, supra note 29, 0.442.
" VA. CODE § 65.1-88 (1973) (amended 1975). The Virginia Act, at the time of the Pettus
case, provided that workmen's compensation recipients were required to accept surgical and
hospital service deemed necessary by the attending physician or by the Virginia Industrial
Commission. The Act further provided, "The refusal of the employee to accept such service
when provided by the employer shall bar the employee from further compensation until such
refusal ceases ... unless, in the opinion of the Industrial Commission, the circumstances
justified the refusal." Id. See Stump v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Corp., 187 Va. 932,
938-39, 48 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1948) (workmen's compensation refused for amputated leg be-
cause employee refused to undergo medical treatment).
3, 33 U.S.C. § 907(d) (1976). The Longshoremen's Act provides in part, "If at any time
the employee unreasonably refuses to submit to medical or surgical treatment, . . . the
Secretary [of Labor] may, by order, suspend the payment of further compensation during
such time as such refusal continues . . . unless the circumstances justified the refusal." Id.
See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Norton, 50 F. Supp. 221, 222-23 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (workmen's
compensation granted although treatment had been refused earlier).
587 F.2d at 629.
3 Id. See generally 1B MooRE's, supra note 29, 0.406 [2]. The Fourth Circuit in Pettus
stated that whether a judicial decision is made by an administrative agency is of no conse-
quence in according the decision res judicata effect. 587 F.2d at 628 n.1. The court inappro-
priately cited Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1977), to
support the position that courts should not treat administrative agency decisions differently
in according res judicata effect. In Mitchell, the Second Circuit actually refused to accord
res judicata effect to an administrative agency's decision. The court applied res judicata
effect to the case only because the administrative agency's decision was affirmed by the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. Id. at 276-77. The United States Supreme Court
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hearings of the Pettus case before the Virginia Industrial Commission pro-
vided the plaintiff ample opportunity to justify his refusal to undergo
surgery.3 Next, the Fourth Circuit noted the plaintiff had not appealed the
Industrial Commission's decision to a Virginia court. 8 The Commission's
decision was therefore considered a final judgment in Virginia and ac-
corded res judicata effect within the state. 9 Finally, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that since the Industrial Commission's decision on justifiability
had res judicata effect in Virginia, the Benefits Review Board was required
to give the decision res judicata effect in the District of Columbia under
the full faith and credit provisions of the United States Constitution" and
the United States Code.' The Fourth Circuit thus concluded that the
Virginia Industrial Commission, by deciding that the plaintiffs refusal to
undergo surgery was unjustified under the Virginia Act, effectively had
decided that the refusal also was unreasonable under the D.C. Act.4"
The Fourth Circuit's according of res judicata effect and application of
the full faith and credit doctrine to the Industrial Commission's finding of
unjustifiability can be criticized on at least two grounds. First, whether the
issue of justifiability to refuse surgery is the same under the Virginia and
D.C. Acts is questionable.13 The Pettus dissent concluded the D.C. Act
favored the plaintiff in three ways." First, the D.C. Act requires a two step
rather than one step consideration of whether a workmen's compensation
claimant justifiably refused surgery. 5 Second, under the D.C. Act the
initial burden of proving that the claimant unreasonably refused treatment
falls upon the employer, while under the Virginia Act the entire burden of
proving justifiability falls under the claimant. Finally, under the D.C.
has noted that while courts may give res judicata effect to decisions of administrative agen-
cies, such effect should not be automatic. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384
U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966).
5 587 F.2d at 629.
Id. See VA. CODE § 65.1-98 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (setting forth procedures for appealing
Industrial Commission decisions). See generally VIRGINIA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra
note 11, at 158-59.
1, 587 F.2d at 629. See Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 126-28, 41
S.E.2d 469, 474-75 (1947); VA. CODE § 65.1-98 (Cum. Supp. 1979); VA. WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION, supra note 11, at 204.
" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state
to the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other State."
" 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) (full faith and credit accorded to state statutes and decisions).
See generally Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942); 1B MooRE's, supra note
29, 0.406[l].
42 587 F.2d at 629.
43 See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
:4 587 F.2d at 634 (Hall, J., dissenting).
5 See id. Under the Virginia Act the Virginia Industrial Commission only considers
whether the refusal to undergo surgery was reasonable. The Department of Labor under the
D.C. Act first makes an objective decision whether the refusal was unreasonable and then
decides whether refusal was justified under the circumstances. Id. See notes 33-34 supra.
11 See 587 F.2d at 634 (Hall, J., dissenting); notes 33-34 supra. See also Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Director, O.W.C.P., 583 F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (4th Cir. 1978),
19801
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Act the Secretary of Labor has the discretion to continue benefits even if
the refusal is judged unreasonable, while termination of benefits under the
Virginia Act is mandatory if the refusal is found unjustified." The Pettus
majority did not consider these differences between the D.C. and Virginia
Acts.
The Pettus court's application of the full faith and credit doctrine also
is questionable." Courts often do not give full faith and credit effect to
workmen's compensation actions.49 Unlike considerations of most legal ac-
tions for damages, tribunals hearing workmen's compensation cases have
little chance to apply the law of another jurisdiction. Administrative agen-
cies, rather than courts, consider most workmen's compensation applica-
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 915 (1979) (doctrine of collateral estoppel does not preclude relitigation
of issue in workmen's compensation action when party against whom doctrine is imposed has
heavier burden of persuasion in first action than in second); Young & Co. v. Shea, 397 F.2d
185, 188-89 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969) (issues decided in common law
action for employment related injuries are not collaterally estopped in action under Long-
shoreman's Act because of differences in standard of proof).
11 See 587 F.2d at 634-35 (Hall, J., dissenting); 6 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. at 464; notes 33-
34 supra. Both the Virginia Act and Longshoremen's Act provisions on justifiability to refuse
treatment have been construed by only one reported court case. See Ryan Stevedoring v.
Norton, 50 F. Supp. 221, 222-23 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (Longshoremen's Act construed); Stump v.
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Corp., 187 Va. 932, 938-39, 48 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1948)
(Virginia Act considered). See also notes 33-34 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
' See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1955) (full faith and credit clause does
not require state of injury to apply sister state's prohibition of common law workmen's
compensation actions); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532,
544-50 (1935) (workmen's compensation act of place of contract may govern benefits recovery
even though employment contract stated that another state's law should govern). See also 4
LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 86.20-35; Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 332-41 (1944) [hereinafter
cited as Cheatham]; Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments,
49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 161-65 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Reese & Johnson].
There are four principal bases for restricting application of full faith and credit in work-
men's compensation actions. Cheatham, supra at 342. First, injured workmen, considered a
necessitous class, have received special treatment in many aspects of the law. Second, as the
Supreme Court recognized in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947), work-
men's compensation statutes concern support of injured persons and multiple jurisdictions
may have an interest in such support. Id. at 476. Third, workmen's compensation cases differ
from most full faith and credit applications as they are heard by an administrative agency
which is the only tribunal allowed to enforce a particular state's workmen's compensation act.
See text accompanying notes 50-52 infra. Finally, adherence to a strict policy of single state
recovery through full faith and credit would allow unscrupulous employers and insurance
carriers to lower their costs by suggesting that injured employees apply for benefits in a
jurisdiction with low benefits. Cheatham, supra at 343-45.
The Pettus case demonstrates that full faith and credit can acquire various meanings in
workmen's compensation actions. The Pettus majority uses full faith and credit to justify
ordering the Benefits Review Board to give res judicata effect to the decision of justifiability
by the Virginia Industrial Commission. 587 F.2d at 629. See text accompanying notes 40-41
supra. The Pettus dissent, however, uses full faith and credit to refer to the issues of whether
any workmen's compensation recovery in Virginia bars a recovery in the District of Columbia.
587 F.2d at 632-33 (Hall, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 53-78 infra.
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tions and these agencies may order recovery only under the workmen's
compensation act of their own jurisdiction.50 Development of the case law
for a particular state's compensation act thus emanates from the state's
administrative agency. To require this administrative agency to accord full
faith and credit to decisions of law and fact made in other states under
different compensation acts would be inappropriate. 5' The Pettus dissent
concluded that while the Industrial Commission's decision should be con-
sidered final as to recovery under the Virginia Act, the Commission's deci-
sion should not affect recovery under the D.C. Act.2
The majority in Pettus may not have been convinced that a finding of
res judicata eliminated all recovery under the D.C. Act. While the court
declared that the basis for overturning the Benefits Review Board was the
finding of res judicata effect,53 the court also concluded that any recovery
under the Virginia Act precluded recovery under the D.C. Act. 4 A finding
of automatic preclusion would seem unnecessary if the res judicata deci-
sion truly eliminated recovery for Pettus under the D.C. Act. The Fourth
Circuit's finding of automatic preclusion is questionable since the finding
is inconsistent with most decisions in similar situations. 6
The Fourt Circuit relied upon Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt57 in
deciding that any recovery under the Virginia Act automatically precluded
recovery under the D.C. Act. 8 In Magnolia, an oil driller who resided in
"0 See COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at 188-89; 4 LARsON, supra note 1, § 84.20, at 16-7 to
8; see, e.g., Green v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 161 F.2d 359, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1947) (only Georgia
State Board of Workmen's compensation and not federal court or a Mississippi circuit court
can order benefits under Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act); cf. Semler v. Psychiatric
Inst., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 929-30 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (wrongful death statutes differ materially
from workmen's compensation acts in that courts hearing wrongful death actions are allowed
to choose which jurisdiction's law to apply to particular case).
"' See, e.g., deCancino v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 283 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 1973) (Florida
Industrial Relations Commission should not give res judicata effect to decision of New York
Compensation Board to dismiss a workmen's compensation claim on the merits).
"' 587 F.2d at 634 (Hall, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 39 supra. See also
Pettus v. American Airlines, Inc., 3 BEN REv. BD. SERV. 315, 319 (B.R.B. No. 75-197, March
19, 1976). /
587 F.2d at 628.
' Id. at 629-32. See text accompanying notes 57-88 infra.
See text accompanying note 42 supra.
58 See text accompanying notes 4 supra & 73 infra. The Pettus court's finding that
recovery under the Virginia Act precluded recovery under the D.C. Act may have contra-
dicted another Fourth Circuit ruling. See Newport News.Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
Director, O.W.C.P., 583 F.2d 1273, 1276 (4th Cir. 1978) (Virginia Industrial Commission's
refusal to grant workmen's compensation benefits under Virginia Act did not preclude recov-
ery under Longshoremen's Act). See also text accompanying notes 79-88 infra.
:7 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
s1 587 F.2d at 630-31. The Fourth Circuit in Pettus found that "precedent of last resort"
refuted the plaintiff's contention that recovery under the D.C. Act was possible after recovery
under the Virginia Act. Id. at 630. No recently reported federal or state decision contains the
phrase "precedent of last resort." Apparently the Fourth Circuit meant to say that precedent
from a court of last resort refuted Pettus' contention. See Embree Uranium Co. v. Liebel,
169 Cal. App. 2d 256, -, 337 P.2d 159, 161 (1959).
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Louisiana was injured in Texas and awarded benefits under the Texas
Workmen's Compensation Act (Texas Act). 51 The worker subsequently
sought additional benefits under the applicable Louisiana statute and the
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the award of benefits."0 The United
States Supreme Court overturned the Louisiana decision concluding that
the Texas award was the claimant's only workmen's compensation recov-
ery because of the exclusive remedy provision' of the Texas Act."2
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Industrial Commission of
Wisconsin v. McCartin3 in which the Court effectively limited the
Magnolia decision. The McCartin Court allowed a Wisconsin resident in-
jured in Illinois to recover under the Wisconsin Act subsequent to recovery
under the Illinois Act. 4 The Illinois Act contained an exclusive remedy
provision similar to the Texas provision in Magnolia." The McCartin
Court, however, ruled that the Illinois exclusive remedy provision only
precluded common law recovery for work related injuries, and not recovery
The Fourth Circuit's exclusive use of cases from the Supreme Court, a court of last resort,
to support a finding of preclusion is significant. While the Magnolia decision supports the
Fourth Circuit's position that recovery under Virginia Act precludes recovery under the D.C.
Act, see text accompanying notes 59-62 infra, the Magnolia decision has been severely limited
and restricted. See text accompanying notes 67-73 infra. Virtually every court that has con-
sidered a state workmen's compensation act with provisions similar to Virginia's has refused
to follow Magnolia. See text accompanying note 73 infra. If the Fourth Circuit had cited
decisions other than Supreme Court decisions, the inadvisability of following Magnolia would
have been apparent.
320 U.S. at 432-33.
'o Id. at 433-34.
T' Ex. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1927) (amended 1953) provides that
a worker injured on the job does not have a common law cause of action for personal injuries
against his employer. Rather, the employer compensates the employee solely through work-
men's compensation insurance. A provision making statutory recovery the injured worker's
exclusive remedy against his employer is a major feature of workmen's compensation legisla-
tion. See note 1 supra. Under workmen's compensation acts, an employer assumes a liability
to compensate the injured worker generally without inquiry as to fault. Through exclusive
remedy provisions, the employer receives in exchange for this guarantee of automatic reasona-
ble compensation, relief from the prospect of large common law damage verdicts. See 2A
LARsON, supra note 1, § 65.10 at 12-1 to 4. See also, Note, Employer Liability in West Virginia:
Compensation Beyond the Law, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 151 (1979) (discussing exemption
from exclusive remedy provisions for certain injuries).
12 320 U.S. at 435-46. The Court in Magnolia noted the claimant's award of benefits in
Texas was a final award in the state and thus took on res judicata effect. The Court reasoned
that the res judicata effect of the award also barred recovery under the compensation act of
any other state through the full faith and credit doctrine. Id. at 436-44. See text accompany-
ing notes 40-41 & 49-52 supra.
13 330 U.S. 62T (1947).
Id. at 630.
'5 4 LARSON, supra note 1, § 85.20 at 16-20. Like the Texas statute in Magnolia, see note
61 supra, the Illinois statute in McCartin provided that any employee covered by the Illinois
Act did not have a common law or statutory right t:a recover damages for his on-the-job
injuries other than the benefits provided in the workmen's compensation act itself. See Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act § 6, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 143 (Smith-Hurd 1942) (current
version at ch. 70, § 138.5(a) (Supp. 1979)).
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under the compensation act of another state. 6 Although McCartin specifi-
cally did not overrule Magnolia,7 the decisions are difficult to reconcile
because there are no significant differences between the exclusive remedy
provision interpreted in each decision. 8 Apparently the decisions are re-
concilable only because the Texas Act contains a provision prohibiting
recovery in Texas if a worker injured outside of the state first recovers
benefits under another state's compensation act."9 The Supreme Court in
Magnolia appeared to read the provision also to prohibit recovery outside
of Texas if the claimant first recovers benefits in Texas.7" The Illinois Act,
like most state compensation acts,7 does not contain an analogous provi-
" 330 U.S. at 627-28. The Supreme Court in McCartin found no indication in the Illinois
exclusive remedy provision, see note 65 supra, or in decisions construing the Illinois provision
that the provision was intended to preclude recovery by proceedings brought in another state.
330 U.S. at 627-28.
11 330 U.S. at 626-27, 630. The McCartin Court concluded that the Illinois award was
different in nature and effect than the Texas award in Magnolia. Id. at 626-27. The McCartin
Court, however, did not explain exactly how the awards were different. See text accompany-
ing notes 68-73 infra.
" See note 65 supra. At first glance, McCartin may be distinguished from Magnolia
because the original Illinois workmen's compensation settlement in McCartin expressly pro-
vided that the settlement did not preclude recovery under the Wisconsin Act. The McCartin
Court, however, ignored this distinction and concluded that the absence in Illinois statutes
or case law of an explicit prohibition against seeking additional or alternative relief under
the laws of another state mandated reversal of the Seventh Circuit. 330 U.S. at 630. See
Larson, Constitutional Law 'Conflicts and Workmen's Compensation, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1037,
1048 [hereinafter cited as Larson, Constitutional].
11 TEx. REv. STAT. ANN., art. 8306, § 19 (Vernon 1931) (amended 1977).
10 The Magnolia Court noted the Texas Act's prohibition of workmen's compensation
recovery in Texas after recovery in another state when the Court discussed the various provi-
sions of the Texas Act. 320 U.S. at 435. Also, the Court specifically refused to determine what
effect would be given to the Magnolia award if Texas courts had not prohibited recovery in
Texas after recovery in other states. Id. at 443. The Pettus dissent found significance in the
Magnolia Court's citing several Texas cases prohibiting recovery in other states. 587 F.2d at
632 (Hall, J., dissenting).
'1 See 4 LARSON, supra note 1, § 85.30 at 16-20 n.40. Apparently Nevada and North
Dakota are the only states other than Texas which refuse workmen's compensation benefits
to a worker injured out of state when the injured worker has sought benefits elsewhere. Id. at
6 n.40 (Cum. Supp. 1979). See NEv. REV. STAT. § 616.530(1) (1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-
05-05 (Pocket Supp. 1979). See also Nevada Indus. Comm'n v. Underwood, 79 Nev. 496, ,
387 P.2d 663, 666 (1963) (Nevada statute precludes recovery under Nevada Act once benefits
have been received in Idaho); Bekkedahl v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 222
N.W.2d 841, 846 (N.D. 1974) (North Dakota statute should not apply where impossible for
injured worker to make knowing choice between recovery under Montana or North Dakota
Acts). But see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bu-
reau, 275 N.W.2d 618, 622 (N.D. 1979) (Bekkedahl should be limited to the facts of that case).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that initial recovery under the North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Act does not bar subsequent recovery under compensation acts of
other states. Cook v. Minneapolis Bridge Constr. Co., 231 Minn. 433, -, 43 N.W.2d 792,
797-98 (1950). Actually, Magnolia may bar recovery in other states once an injured worker
recovers compensation in North Dakota. The North Dakota Act, like the Texas Act in
Magnolia, has a provision barring recovery in North Dakota if a worker injured elsewhere
recovers under another state compensation act. The Magnolia Court apparently relied on the
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sion on single state recovery.72 Virtually every court interpreting a compen-
sation act without a single state recovery provision similar to the Texas
statute has followed McCartin rather than Magnolia and allowed recovery
under more than one compensation act.
3
The Fourth Circuit in Pettus, however, applied Magnolia rather than
McCartin, and denied recovery, even though the Virginia Act does not
have a section similar to the single state provision in the Texas Act.74 The
Fourth Circuit justified the application of Magnolia on the similarity of the
basic exclusive remedy provisions of the Texas and Virginia Acts.75 How-
ever, the Virginia exclusive remedy provision also is similar to the Illinois
statute interpreted in McCartin.78 Numerous cases have interpreted the
Virginia exclusive remedy provision's effect on common law recovery for
work related accidents,77 yet no Virginia case has considered application
of the provision to workmen's compensation recovery under the compensa-
tion acts of other jurisdictions.
78
Texas Act provision to bar recovery elsewhere once an injured worker recovered in Texas. See
text accompanying note 70 supra.
72 See 4 LARSON; supra note 1, § 85.30 at 16-20 to 21.
73 See Larson, Conflicts, supra note 3, at 132; see, e.g., In re Lavoie's Case, 334 Mass.
403, -, 135 N.E.2d 750, 753-54, cert. denied 350 U.S. 927 (1956) (Magnolia exclusivity
provision not read into Rhode Island law allowing Massachusetts recovery); Spietz v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 251 Wis. 168, -, 28 N.W.2d 354, 359 (1947) (McCartin applied to Mon-
tana law); cf. Cofer v. Industrial Comm'n, 24 Ariz. App. 357, -, 538 P.2d 1158, 1159-60
(1975) (Magnolia applicable to case because original award was in Texas but criticizing
Magnolia Court's interpretation of Texas statute). See also BLAre, REFERENCE GUIDE TO
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 23.00 (1974); 4 LARSON, supra note 1, § 85.40; Reese & Johnson,
supra note 49, at 159-60; Note, Workmen's Compensation, 60 HARv. L. REv. 993, 993-94
(1947); Note, Conflict of Laws, Workmen's Compensation, 23 IND. L.J. 214, 214-18 (1948);
notes 4 & 65 supra.
The only decision, other than Pettus, precluding recovery in a second jurisdiction when
the first jurisdiction did not have a single state recovery provision similar to the Texas Act
provision is Gasch v. Britton, 202 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Gasch held the Maryland Act
and Maryland case law precluded subsequent recovery in other states. Id. at 360-61. See
Larson, Conflicts, supra note 3, at 132. The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, has held
that Gasch misconstrued an earlier Maryland decision and misinterpreted the Maryland
statute. Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 260 Md. 651, 658-64, 273 A.2d 125, 129-31 (1971).
1, 587 F.2d at 631. See id. at 633 (Hall, J. dissenting).
11 Id. at 631.
78 See text accompanying note 65 supra. The Virginia Act provides that the remedies
granted in the Act itself exclude all other remedies of the injured employee at common law
or otherwise. VA. CODE § 65.1-40 (1973). See notes 61 & 65 supra.
" See, e.g., Snead v. Nello L. Teer Co., 353 F. Supp. 434, 435-37 (W.D. Va. 1973)
(common law action against main contractor on construction job refused where plaintiff was
employee of subcontractor); Holt v. Bowie, 343 F. Supp. 962, 965-66 (W.D. Va. 1972) (cause
of action granted against city of Bristol for which plaintiff's employer was building bus
garage). See generally VA. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note 11, at 183-201; Workmen's
Compensation, Eighteenth Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law: 1972-1973, 59
VA. L. REv. 1632, 1632 & n.6 (1973).
11 See 587 F.2d at 633 (Hall, J., dissenting); VA. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, supra note
11, at 183-201 (no mention of recovery under other states' compensation acts during discus-
sion of Virginia Act exclusivity provision). No reported Virginia decision has cited either
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The only case considering the applicability of the Virginia exclusive
remedy provision to other workmen's compensation acts is the recent
Fourth Circuit decision in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.
v. Director, 0. W. C.P.79 In Newport News, the Fourth Circuit found that
the Virginia Act's exclusive remedy provision did not preclude an injured
worker from recovering under the Federal Longshoremen's Act 0 after the
Virginia Industrial Commission denied compensation to the claimant.'
The Newport News court concluded that the reasoning of McCartin was
more applicable to the Virginia exclusive remedy provision than the rea-
soning of Magnolia.2
Based on the Newport News decision, which was issued after oral argu-
ments in Pettus," the Pettus appellees sought a rehearing claiming the
Newport News and Pettus interpretations of the Virginia exclusive remedy
provision were contradictory. 4 The Fourth Circuit denied the Pettus re-
hearing." In a supplemental opinion, the Pettus majority distinguished
Newport News by concluding that the Newport News plaintiff received
Longshoremen's Act benefits solely because proof of injury requirements
in the Virginia Act made state recovery impossible. By contrast, the
Pettus plaintiff would have received Virginia Act benefits had he not re-
fused to undergo corrective surgery. A thorough reading of Newport News
shows the Pettus court seriously misinterpreted the reasoning in Newport
News. The Newport News court did not compare or discuss the proof of
injury requirements in the Virginia and Longshoremen's Acts. Rather, the
Newport News opinion discussed five separate issues, three involving the
possibility of recovery under two compensation acts, and resolved all the
issues in the claimant's favor.8
McCartin or Magnolia in a workmen's compensation context. See Osborne v. Osborne, 215
Va. 205, 207-08, 207 S.E.2d 875, 879 (1974) (Magnolia applicable in divorce case).
70 583 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1978).
" In Newport News, unlike Pettus, thi Longshoremen's Act was directly applied because
the claimant was employed in an eligible maritime occupation. See note 6 supra.
a 583 F.2d at 1276.
'* Id. at 1278. The Newport News court did not find a conflict with the Virginia exclusiv-
ity provision, see note 76 supra, when the claimant sought recovery under the Longshoremen's
Act. 583 F.2d at 1278.
m Pettus was argued June 8, 1978. 587 F.2d at 627. Newport News was argued May 1,
1978, and decided September 21, 1978. 583 F.2d at 1273.
11 587 F.2d at 635.
8 Id.
.. Id. at 635-36. In Newport News the claimant originally applied for benefits under the
Virginia Act. The Virginia Industrial Commission denied benefits because the Commission
found insufficient proof that the claimant's injuries were work related. The claimant then
applied for and received benefits under the Longshoremen's Act. 583 F.2d at 1276.
17 587 F.2d at 635.
18 583 F.2d at 1276-81. The Newport News court considered whether the election of
remedies doctrine applies to the Virginia Act, id. at 1276-78, whether res judicata effect
should be applied to the decision of the Virginia Commission, id. at 1278, whether McCartin
or Magnolia should be applied to recoveries under the Virginia Act, id. at 1278-79, and two
procedural issues, id. at 1279-81.
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The Supreme Court may soon resolve the apparent conflict between
Pettus and Newport News as to whether the Virginia Act precludes subse-
quent recovery under other compensation acts. The Court has granted
certiorari in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. 9 in which the Fourth
Circuit reversed the award of D.C. Act benefits to a District of Columbia
resident injured in Virginia. 0 As in Pettus, the Thomas plaintiff originally
received Virginia Act benefits and subsequently applied for D.C. Act bene-
fits.9' The Benefits Review Board granted the D.C. Act benefits, citing its
own Pettus decision.92 The Fourth Circuit reversed the Benefits Review
Board. 3 If the Supreme Court in deciding Thomas follows the generally
accepted readings of the Magnolia and McCartin decisions, the Court
should reverse the Fourth Circuit and conclude that the Virginia Act does
not preclude subsequent recovery under other compensation acts.94
By overturning Thomas, the Court would effectively overturn the
Pettus interpretation of the Virginia Act thus affirming the Newport News
position that workers injured in Virginia may recover under more than one
compensation act.95 Until Thomas is decided, however, recipients of Vir-
ginia Act benefits are precluded from recovery under other compensation
acts even though eligibility standards under other acts are met."8 There-
fore, injured workers eligible for recovery in Virginia and in other jurisdic-
tions should survey available benefits under each compensation act before
applying for benefits. Such a survey of benefits, however, may be impracti-
cal or incomplete. The cqnsideration of statutorily mandated benefits may
not guarantee the highest possible recovery because compensation acts
31 9 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. 760 (B.R.B. No. 77-182, Feb. 28, 1978), rev'd mem., 598 F.2d
617 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 447 (1979). See Court Will Decide D.C. Work-
men's Benefit Law Case, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 1979, at E-1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as
Workmen's Benefit Law Case].
,o In Thomas, the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, was hired in Washington, D.C.
but worked in Virginia and Maryland as well as in Washington. The plaintiff injured his back
while working in Virginia and was granted temporary total disability. 9 BEN. REv. BD. SERV.
at 761.
" Following the injury, the Thomas plaintiff and defendant voluntarily agreed that
compensation would be awarded under the Virginia Act. The Virginia Act, however, has a
statutorily mandated maximum for total benefits so compensation was subsequently sought
under the D.C. Act which has no limit on total benefits. Workmen's Benefit Law Case, supra
note 89, at E-1, col. 6.
92 9 BEN. REv. BD. SERV. at 763. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra. The Benefits
Review Board decision in Thomas was issued after the Board decided Pettus but before the
Fourth Circuit overturned Pettus and held that the Virginia Act precluded subsequent recov-
ery under the D.C. Act. 9 BEN. REV. BD. SERV. at 766.
598 F.2d at 617.
" See text accompanying notes 58-72 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 79-88 supra. If the Supreme Court overturns Thomas and
thus finds that the Pettus court misinterpreted the Virginia Act, Pettus still will be prevented
from recovering D.C. Act benefits. The Fourth Circuit in Pettus also found that the Virginia
Industrial Commission's ruling that the plaintiff unjustifiably refused surgery under the
Virginia Act obligated the Department of Labor to find that the plaintiff unreasonably re-
fused surgery under the D.C. Act. See text accompanying notes 29-52 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
